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Recent Developments

MVA v. Richards
The Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment Does Not Extend to Civil
Administrative Driver's License Suspension Proceedings
ByLeeADix

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland declined to
extend the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment to Motor Vehicle
Administration license suspension
hearings. Motor Vehicle Admin. v.
Richards, 356 Md. 356, 739 A.2d
58 (1999). The court specifically held
the rule inapplicable in civil
administrative license suspension
hearings under section 16-205.1 of
the Transportation Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland. The
court further held that the
constitutionality of a motor vehicle
stop may not be challenged in the
resulting administrative proceeding.
On October 24, 1997, at
approximately 12:30 a.m., a
Maryland State Trooper, patrolling in
the Carroll County town of
Westminster, observed a vehicle
stopped in the middle of the road.
Aware that Westminster had been
experiencing a wave of nighttime
burglaries and vehicle thefts, the
trooper decided to follow the vehicle.
The trooper then stopped the
vehicle to determine what business the
driver had in the neighborhood. As
the trooper spoke to the driver, David
Richards, ("Richards") he detected a
strong odor of alcohol. The trooper
administered a field sobriety test, and
Richards was subsequently arrested.
While under custodial arrest, Richards
refused to take a chemical breath test

to determine his blood-alcohol level.
In accordance with administrative
procedure section 16-205.1 of the
Transportation Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, the
trooper issued an order suspending
Richards's driver's license.
Richards requested a hearing
under section 16-205.1 (f) to
determine the validity of his driver's
license suspension.
The
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
concluded that Richards's license was
properly suspended, based on his
refusal to take the chemical breath
test. Moreover, the ALJ concluded
that reasonable grounds existed for the
stop and that the trooper acted in good
faith. The Circuit Court for Carroll
County, on judicial review of the
ALl's determination, reversed the
suspension of Richards's license,
stating that insufficient justification
existed to support the stop. The
Motor Vehicle Administration
("MV A") petitioned the Court of
Appeals of Maryland for a writ of
certiorari, which it granted to consider
whether the exclusionary rule applies
in driver's license suspension
proceedings conducted pursuant to
section 16-205.1(f) barring the
introduction of evidence obtained
during an unlawful motor vehicle stop.
The court began its analysis by
reviewing the language ofsection 16205.1, specifically the implied consent

provision. Richards, 356 Md. at
363, 739 A.2d at 62. The court
noted that the statute established that
any person driving on a public
roadway in Maryland has implicitly
consented, if reasonably requested,
to a test to determine breath or blood
alcohol level. 1d. Additionally, the
statute provided that refusal to take
the test will result in automatic
suspension ofthe person's license to
drive. Id. The court of appeals, in
reviewing the statute, stated that
section 16-205.1 (f)(7) provides that
the administrative hearing is not to
consider the constitutionality of the
stop, or the possible exclusion of
unconstitutionally seized evidence.
!d. at 367, 739 A2d at 64.
The court examined the
Supreme Court's position in
extending the exclusionary rule ofthe
Fourth Amendment beyond the
criminal trial context. Upon review
ofnumerous decisions issued by the
Supreme Court during the past
quarter century, the court of appeals
concluded that the Supreme Court
refused to extend the exclusionary
rule to civil proceedings, with the
exception of civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings. 1d. at 368, 739 A2d
at 65. The Supreme Court viewed
the in rem forfeiture proceedings as
quasi-criminal in nature and,
therefore, warranted application of
exclusionary rule. Id. In 1998, the
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Supreme Court again refused to
extend the exclusionary rule beyond
criminal proceedings.
Id.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held
that the exclusionary rule is "applicable
only where its deterrence benefits
outweigh its 'substantial social costs. '"
Id. at 369, 739 A.2d at 65 (quoting
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897,907 (1984)).
The court of appeals next
examined the case law of Maryland
addressing the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.
Id at 370, 739 A.2d at 66. Thecourt
found that outside ofthe criminal trial
context that the exclusionary rule is
applicable only in civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings due to the quasi-criminal
nature of the hearings. Id In so
holding, the court ofappeals reiterated
the Supreme Court's statement that
''the 'prime purpose' ofthe rule, ifnot
the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful
police conduct.'" Id. at 371, 739
A.2d at 67 (quoting United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))).
Additionally, the court stated that the
marginal deterrence of extending the
exclusionary rule, coupled with the
substantial cost, does not justify its
application in civil proceedings. Id
After completing its examination
of the language of section 16-205.1,
the Supreme Court's application ofthe
exclusionary rule, and the case law of
Maryland, the court of appeals
addressed the issue of whether the
exclusionary rule applied in
administrative license suspension
proceedings conducted pursuant to
section 16-205.1(f). The court
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rejected the proposition that
proceedings under this section are
quasi-criminal in nature. Id. at 372,
739 A.2d at 67. The court stated that
although the suspension or revocation
of one's license under section 16205.1 may appear "purely punitive"
and "quasi-criminal" in nature, the
ultimate goal is to prevent
unscrupulous or incompetent persons
from continuing to drive automobiles.
Id at 373, 739 A.2d at 68.
Having decided that the license
suspension proceedings were not
quasi-criminal, the court used the
traditional cost benefit analysis to
determine whether the exclusionary
rule applied in administrative license
suspension proceedings. Id at 372,
739 A.2d at 67. The court opined
that whether the case involved test
refusal or test failure, the deterrent
effect of exclusion would be
insignificant, as the police already
suffer exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence from criminal proceedings.
Id. at 374, 739 A.2d at 69.
Additionally, the court noted that the
MYA and police departments operate
as independent agencies, and
imposing the exclusionary rule in
license suspension proceedings would
do little to deter unlawful police
action. Id at 375, 739 A.2d at 69.
Turning to the cost side of the
test, the court concluded that applying
the exclusionary rule in hearings
conducted pursuant to section 16205.1 would create substantial cost.
Id. at 376, 739 A.2d at 69. The court
stated that applying the rule would
complicate the proceedings and
severely undermine its purpose to
protect the public. Id.

With it decision in Richards, the
court of appeals continues to strictly
adhere to its prior decisions and the
Supreme Court's precedent of
refusing to extend the exclusionary rule
to civil proceedings. The court clearly
stated that any future extension ofthe
rule to civil proceedings in Maryland
will occur only when the goal of
deterring unlawful police practices
outweighs the social benefit of not
applying the rule.

